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Abstract
Researchers have shown that the predictions of a con-
volutional neural network (CNN) for an image set can be
severely distorted by one single image-agnostic perturba-
tion, or universal perturbation, usually with an empirically
fixed threshold in the spatial domain to restrict its perceiv-
ability. However, by considering the human perception, we
propose to adopt JND thresholds to guide the perceivability
of universal adversarial perturbations. Based on this, we
propose a frequency-tuned universal attack method to com-
pute universal perturbations and show that our method can
realize a good balance between perceivability and effec-
tiveness in terms of fooling rate by adapting the perturba-
tions to the local frequency content. Compared with exist-
ing universal adversarial attack techniques, our frequency-
tuned attack method can achieve cutting-edge quantitative
results. We demonstrate that our approach can significantly
improve the performance of the baseline on both white-box
and black-box attacks.
1. Introduction
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have shown
great potential in various computer vision problems; how-
ever, these CNNs were shown to be vulnerable to pertur-
bations in their input, even when such perturbations are
small [32]. By adding such a small perturbation to the input
image, a CNN-based classifier can be easily fooled and can
alter its predictions, while a human can still correctly clas-
sify the perturbed input image. Furthermore, researchers
conducted various studies on the vulnerabilities of CNNs to
adversarial attacks in the image understanding area, inlcud-
ing image classification [6, 19, 12, 18] and semantic seg-
mentation [35, 34, 24]. Generally, the proposed adversarial
attack algorithms can be categorized as black-box attacks
and white-box attacks according to the accessibility to the
attacked model. Usually, a black-box attack have little or no
access to the targeted model, with its predictions as the only
possible feedback [3]. Thus, one can perform such an attack
by making use of gradient estimation [5, 2, 14], transferabil-
ity [23, 18], local search [8, 13] or combinatorics [17].
On the contrary, for a white-box attack, we have full
knowledge about the targeted model, such as its architec-
ture, weight and gradient information, during the computa-
tion of the perturbation. In this case, the perturbation can
be optimized effectively with the model information and an
objective function by backpropagation. Additionally, there
are thousands of publicly available CNN models on which
we can carry out white-box adversarial attacks. Thus, to
find a small but effective adversarial perturbation, we tend
to utilize the white-box attack. One interesting direction of
the white-box attack is the universal adversarial attack. In
this latter case, a single perturbation, which is computed us-
ing a training set with a relatively small number of images,
can be applied to input images to fool a targeted model [18].
Given the good cross-model generalization of white-box at-
tacks [18, 25], we can also extend the universal perturba-
tions that are pretrained on one or multiple popular CNN
models to black-box attacks on other unseen models.
However, most of the universal adversarial attack meth-
ods attempt to decrease the perceptibility of the computed
perturbation δ by limiting the lp norm, p ∈ [1,∞), to not
exceed a fixed threshold (for instance, ‖δ‖∞ ≤ 10 for an 8-
bit image). This type of thresholding method treats different
image/texture regions identically and does not take human
perception sensitivity into consideration. Aiming to solve
this problem, we introduce the just-noticeable-difference
(JND) into our universal attacks. JND is the minimum con-
trast for a human to perceive the change before and after
adding such a small value. In fact, JND is not fixed but
varies with the local image characteristics including but not
limited to background intensity and frequency content. For
example, human contrast sensitivity can be regarded as a
function of frequency. Generally, a human is more sensi-
tive to intensity changes that occur in the image regions that
are dominated by low to middle frequency content, which
means JNDs are expected to be lower in such regions [1, 10]
than those with high-mid and high frequency content. Con-
sequently, it is more reasonable to adaptively adjust the
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No attack UAP [18] FTUAP-FF FTUAP-MHF FTUAP-MF
quail 100% quail 97% peacock 99% peacock 89% peacock 96%
wombat 99% brain coral 47% brain coral 52% brain coral 84% brain coral 87%
barn 100% barn 73% peacock 47% backpack 12% safety pin 40%
Figure 1: Examples of perturbed images. From left to right: unperturbed image, perturbed images by UAP in the spatial
domain [18] and our frequency-tuned UAP (FTUAP) in all frequency bands (FF), middle and high frequency bands (MHF),
and middle frequency bands (MF). The original (green) and perturbed predictions (red) with their corresponding confidence
scores are listed under each image.
thresholds for different regions based on frequency content
with the guidance of JND.
Therefore, instead of directly computing the perturba-
tions directly in the spatial image, which has been widely
used by many universal attack algorithms, we propose to
conduct our attacks in the frequency domain by adopting
the perception-based JND threshold and tuning the com-
puted perturbation based on frequency content. Moreover,
we can also examine the effects of different frequency bands
on training perturbations as well as find a balance between
the good effectiveness of universal attacks and the invisi-
bility to human eyes. Some adversarial examples that are
produced with our proposed frequency-tuned universal at-
tack (FTUAP) method are shown in Figure 1.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones
to take human perception sensitivity into account to
compute imperceptible or quasi-imperceptible univer-
sal perturbations. We propose to adopt a JND thresh-
old to mimic the perception sensitivity of human vi-
sion and guide the computation of universal perturba-
tions. The JND threshold for each frequency band is
calculated specifically based on the parametric model
which approximates luminance-based contrast sensi-
tivity [1, 10].
2) We conduct a series of ablation experiments, on the
universal perturbations trained in different frequency
bands. We test and compare the results with respect to
attack performance and visibility extensively and sug-
gest that the universal attacks on middle and high fre-
quency bands can be both effective and nearly imper-
ceptible.
3) We show that the universal perturbation by our method
can significantly improve the performance in terms of
fooling rate/top-1 accuracy as compared to the normal
universal attack method, achieve a similar or higher at-
tacking result with much less perceptibility, and also
present stronger ability even when attacking the de-
fended models.
4) By collecting histograms of perturbation values in
both spatial and frequency domains, we analyze the
perturbation distribution properties of our algorithm
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with repect to the difference from UAP [18] and JND
thresholds.
2. Related Works
In this paper, we mainly focus on the white-box uni-
versal adversarial attacks given its light size (the same as
one single image), considerable effectiveness (can cause se-
vere malfunction of the targeted model on the image set)
and promising transferability (good cross-model general-
ization). First, we will introduce some image-dependent
attack algorithms because they can be adopted into the
pipeline of some universal attack methods, followed by
related work on universal attacks and frequency-based at-
tacks.
2.1. Image-dependent Attacks
The attack power can be maximized by computing an
image-dependent perturbation for each input image sepa-
rately. Goodfellow et al [6] found that only a single step
of gradient ascent, referred to as fast gradient sign method
(FGSM), based on the original input image and loss func-
tion can generate an adversarial example with a large fool-
ing probability, within an almost imperceptible scale com-
pared to the image scale. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al [19] pro-
posed DeepFool to compute the minimum perturbation that
reaches the decision boundary of the classifier. Later, Ku-
rakin et al [12] introduced an iterative gradient sign method
(IGSM) algorithm, which consists of a multistep FGSM. An
alternative for gradient calculation is the least likely class
method [12]. Instead of maximizing the loss on the true
label, it minimizes the loss on the label with the lowest pre-
diction probability for the clean image. Modas et al [16]
showed that strong quasi-imperceptible attacks can be ob-
tained by perturbing only few pixels without limiting the
perturbation’s norm.
2.2. Universal Attacks
While the aforementioned methods deal with image-
dependent adversarial perturbations, the generation of a uni-
versal, image-agnostic perturbation is a more challenging
topic because it aims to find one universal perturbation that
can drastically reduce the prediction accuracy when applied
to any input image. Based on the DeepFool algorithm [19],
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al [18] generated universal adversar-
ial perturbations (UAP) by accumulating the updates itera-
tively for all the training images. Fast Feature Fool [21] and
GD-UAP [20] did not make use of training data but rather
aimed to produce a perturbation by inputing it into the tar-
geted model and maximizing the mean activations of differ-
ent hidden layers, while the latter also took advantage of im-
age statistical information. The data-independent methods
are unsupervised and not as strong as the aforementioned
supervised ones. Thus, in this paper, we will mainly focus
on supervised universal perturbations. Recently, generative
adversarial networks were adopted to generate the univer-
sal perturbation in [24, 25], where the adversarial networks
were set as the targeted models. Poursaeed et al [24] trained
the generative network using a fixed random pattern as input
to produce the generative adversarial perturbation (GAP),
while Mopuri et al [25] introduced both fooling and diver-
sity objectives as the loss function of their network for ad-
versary generation (NAG) to learn the perturbation distribu-
tion through random patterns sampled from the latent space.
The authors of [22] and [27] (iPGD) use mini-batch based
stochastic PGD during training by maximizing the average
loss over each mini-batch.
2.3. Frequency Attacks
Prior to our work, there have been several papers per-
forming adversarial attacks in the frequency domain. Guo
et al [7] presented a black-box attack by randomly search-
ing in low frequency bands in the DCT domain. Sharma et
al [28] showed that both undefended and defended models
are vulnerable to low frequency attacks. However, the au-
thors of [7, 28] set the limit on the perturbation norm in the
spatial domain instead of the frequency domain, and these
existing methods generate significantly perceivable pertur-
bations by focusing on low frequency components and sup-
pressing the high frequency components. The resulting low-
frequency perturbations can be easily perceived by humans
even with a small perturbation norm. Wang et al [33] im-
proved the robustness of CNNs against adversarial attacks
by preserving the low frequency components of input im-
ages. Their attacks consist of blurring the input images by
removing high frequency components, which is equivalent
to low pass filtering the input images with the degree of the
”blur” attack controlled by how many high frequency com-
ponents get removed or filtered out.
3. Frequency-Tuned Attacks
3.1. Discrete Cosine Transform
3.1.1 Formula Representation
The Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is a fundamental tool
that is used in signal, image and video processing, espe-
cially for data compression, given its properties of energy
compaction in the frequency domain and real-number trans-
form. In our paper, we adopt the orthogonal Type-II DCT
transform, whose formula is identical to its inverse DCT
transform. The DCT transform formula can be expressed
as:
X(k1, k2) =
N1−1∑
n1=0
N2−1∑
n2=0
x(n1, n2)c1(n1, k1)c2(n2, k2)
(1)
3
ci(ni, ki) = c˜i(ki) cos
(
pi(2ni + 1)ki
2Ni
)
,
0 ≤ ni, ki ≤ Ni − 1, i = 1, 2
(2)
c˜i(ki) =

√
1
Ni
, ki = 0√
2
Ni
, ki 6= 0
, i = 1, 2. (3)
In Equation 1, x(n1, n2) is the image pixel value at loca-
tion (n1, n2) and X(k1, k2) is the DCT transform of the
N1×N2 image block. Usually, we setN1 = N2 = 8. Using
the DCT transform, an 8× 8 spatial block x(n1, n2) can be
converted to an 8× 8 frequency response block X(k1, k2),
with a total of 64 frequency bands. Suppose we have a
224 × 224 gray image x. Given that the DCT transform
is block-wise with N1 = N2 = 8, we can divide the image
into 28 × 28 = 784 non-overlapping 8 × 8 blocks. Then
we can obtain its DCT transform X(nˆ1, nˆ2, k1, k2), where
k1, k2 denote 2-D frequency indices and the 2-D block in-
dices (nˆ1, nˆ2) satisfy 0 ≤ nˆ1, nˆ2 ≤ 27.
3.1.2 Matrix Representation
For better computation efficiency, we can represent
the DCT transform as a matrix operation. Here, let
c(n1, n2, k1, k2) = c1(n1, k1)c2(n2, k2), and further per-
form a flattening operation by representing the spatial in-
dices n1, n2 as s and frequency indices k1, k2 as b, where
s = 8n1 + n2 and b = 8k1 + k2, 0 ≤ s, b ≤ 63. We define
C = {c(s, b)} as the 64×64 DCT coefficient matrix, where
s corresponds to the flattened spatial index of the block and
b indicates the flattened frequency index. If we consider an
8× 8 image block x and its vectorized version xv , the DCT
transform can be written as:
Xv = C
Txv, (4)
which is a simple matrix dot product operation and Xv is
the vectorized frequency response in the DCT domain. To
compute the DCT transform for a 224×224 image, one can
construct xv as a stack of multiple vectorized image blocks
with proper reshaping. In this case, xv becomes a 784× 64
image stack with each row corresponding to the vectorized
8 × 8 image block, and 784 indicates the number of image
blocks, and Xv is also a 784 × 64 stack with vectorized
DCT transform blocks in each row. This can be easily ex-
tended to color images or image batches by adding channels
to the stack. With this representation, we can directly plug
the DCT transform in the backpropagation process to effi-
ciently compute the perturbation within the frequency do-
main. In fact, by only flattening the frequency indices as
b, we can directly add a convolutional layer with a fixed
DCT matrix C = {c(n1, n2, b)} and a stride of 8 to im-
plement the block-wise DCT transform followed by inverse
DCT transform before the targeted CNN model.
3.2. Perception-based JND Thresholds
Inspired by human perception sensitivity, we compute
the JND thresholds in the DCT domain by adopting the
luminance-model-based JND thresholds [1, 10]. Overall,
the JND thresholds for different frequency bands can be
computed as
tDCT (k1, k2) =
MT (k1, k2)
2c˜1(k1)c˜2(k2)(Lmax − Lmin) , (5)
where Lmin and Lmax are the minimum and maximum dis-
play luminance, and M = 255 for 8-bit image. To com-
pute the background luminance-adjusted contrast sensitiv-
ity T (k1, k2), Ahumada et al proposed an approximating
parametric model1 [1]:
log10(T (k1, k2)) = log10
Tmin
r + (1− r) cos2 θ(k1, k2)
+K(log10 f(k1, k2)− log10 fmin)2.
(6)
The frequency f(k1, k2) and its orientation θ(k1, k2) are
given as follows:
f(k1, k2) =
1
2NDCT
√
k21
w2x
+
k22
w2y
,
θ(k1, k2) = arcsin
2f(k1, 0)f(0, k2)
f2(k1, k2)
,
(7)
and the luminance-dependent parameters are generated by
the following equations:
Tmin =
{ (
L
LT
)αT
LT
S0
, L ≤ LT
L
S0
, L > LT
,
fmin =
{
f0
(
L
Lf
)αf
, L ≤ Lf
f0, L > Lf
,
K =
{
K0
(
L
LK
)αK
, L ≤ LK
K0, L > LK
.
(8)
The values of constants in equations 6-8 are r = 0.7,
NDCT = 8, LT = 13.45 cd/m2, S0 = 94.7, αT = 0.649,
f0 = 6.78 cycles/degree, αf = 0.182, Lf = 300 cd/m2,
K0 = 3.125, αK = 0.0706, and LK = 300 cd/m2. Given
a viewing distance of 60 cm and a 31.5 pixels-per-cm (80
pixels-per-inch), the horizontal width/vertical height of a
pixel (wx/wy) is 0.0303 degree of visual angle [15]. In
practice, for a measured luminance of Lmin = 0 cd/m2 and
Lmax = 175 cd/m2 ,we use the luminance L corresponding
1T (k1, k2) can be computed for any k1, k2 which satisfy k1k2 6= 0 by
this model, while T (0, 0) needs to be estimated as min(T (0, 1), T (1, 0)).
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train test train test
UAP FTUAP
Figure 2: The flowchart examples for updating univer-
sal perturbations δ on the single image input by UAP and
FTUAP.
∏
denotes the projection operation, i.e., threshold-
ing in l∞ norm. X indicates the DCT transform of the im-
age x, while δx and δX are perturbations computed in the
spatial domain and DCT domain, respectively.
to the median value of image during computation as follow-
ing [11]:
L = Lmin + 128
Lmax − Lmin
M
(9)
To be more flexible, we introduce a threshold coefficient
λ. Thus, our final threshold tˆDCT = λtDCT . When λ = 2,
the JND threshold matrix tˆDCT (k1, k2) for an 8-bit image
in DCT domain is

34.61 24.48 8.39 7.81 9.52 12.78 17.83 25.20
24.48 12.47 6.91 6.32 7.45 9.76 13.39 18.71
8.39 6.91 7.77 8.22 9.50 11.95 15.80 21.44
7.81 6.32 8.22 10.27 12.49 15.53 19.93 26.20
9.52 7.45 9.50 12.49 16.03 20.27 25.76 33.16
12.78 9.76 11.95 15.53 20.27 26.09 33.28 42.44
17.83 13.39 15.80 19.93 25.76 33.28 42.60 54.19
25.20 18.71 21.44 26.20 33.16 42.44 54.19 68.78
 .
(10)
Also, we can train the perturbations on some specified fre-
quency bands by partially setting tˆDCT = 0 on the irrele-
vant bands.
3.3. Frequency-Tuned Universal Perturbations
With the above matrix operation of DCT transform and
JND threshold matrix, we can extend any existing gradient-
based adversarial attack algorithm to a frequency-tuned at-
tack. In our implementation, we adapt UAP [18] to our
frequency-tuned attacks. Figure 2 illustrates the proposed
frequency-tuned UAP (FTUAP) as compared to the spatial-
domian UAP [18].
Given the 8 × 8 DCT frequency matrix, we recombine
them as 15 nonoverlapping slanting frequency bands along
the diagonal direction, i.e., the i-th slanting bands consists
of all the previous frequency bands in (k1, k2) such that
k1 + k2 = i, 0 ≤ i ≤ 14. Further, we divide the whole
Figure 3: The division of frequency. The location in each
box indicates the 2-D frequency index (k1, k2). The adja-
cent frequencies with the same color along diagonals are in
the same slanting frequency bands. Low, middle and high
frequency regions are presented in orange, green and blue
(regardless of the color saturation).
frequency bands as low (0 ≤ i ≤ 3), middle (4 ≤ i ≤ 10)
and high (11 ≤ i ≤ 14) frequency regions without overlap,
as illustrated in Figure 3.
4. Experiments and Analyses
We compute the universal perturbations on 10000 ran-
domly sampled images from the ILSVRC 2012 Ima-
geNet [26] training set if not specified, and all of our im-
plemented results (fooling rate/top-1 accuracy) are reported
through evaluation on the full validation set with 50000
images of ImageNet. To restrict the perturbations during
training, we set ‖δ‖∞ ≤ 10 for UAP and take (10) as
the DCT thresholds for our FTUAP. We stop the train-
ing process of the universal perturbations after 5 epochs
on VGG and ResNet models, and after 10 epochs on In-
ception models. For quantative results, we adopt com-
monly used top-1 accuracy and fooling rate as the met-
rics. Given an image set X and a universal perturbation
δ in the spatial domain, the fooling rate can be expressed
as FR = 1n
∑n
i=1Jkˆ(xi + δ) 6= kˆ(xi)K, xi ∈ X , where
kˆ(xi) is the predicted label by the classifier.
4.1. Perceivability vs. Effectiveness
To show perceivability and effectiveness on different fre-
quency bands, we use our FTUAP algorithm to train the
perturbations on low, middle, high frequency bands and all
the combined frequency bands (full frequency), separately,
then we compare the visual examples and give the fool-
ing rates evaluated on the whole validation set with those
by UAP and unperturbed ones, as shown in Figure 4. For
the FTUAP method, all the visual results are perturbed in
the frequency domain and then inversely transformed to the
spatial domain.
According to the first row in Figure 4, the low frequency
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low freq.: 30.9% mid freq.: 84.9% high freq.: 71.6%
low&mid freq.: 91.6% low&high freq.: 80.1% mid&high freq.: 91.7%
full freq.: 93.6% spatial: 84.2% no attack: 0%
Figure 4: The visual examples of UAP in the spatial domain and our FTUAP in various combinations of frequency bands. For
each example, we show the perturbed image (left) and its close-up (right), with corresponding attacking domain and fooling
rate on validation set below the images.
perturbation generally causes only color artifacts (on the
ground region in the image), and middle and high frequency
perturbations produce more imperceptible texture patterns,
for which we can observe the details in the close-ups. The
perturbation in middle frequency bands contains more spi-
ral patterns while high frequency patterns are visually more
sparse yet locally intense. In the examples in the combina-
tions of frequency bands, it seems that the patterns in differ-
ent frequency bands are additive and can coexist. As com-
pared to UAP, our FTUAP on full frequency bands shows
similar perceivability on the whole perturbed image and we
can only recognize stronger perturbation texture patterns in
the close-ups, which means humans are more sensitive to
the difference with low frequency components under the re-
striction of JND thresholds.
In terms of fooling rates, FTUAP on middle frequency
bands can perform better than that on low or high frequency
bands with a large gap, even exceeding UAP by 0.7%.
Further, FTUAP can achieve very high fooling rate results
when combining middle frequency bands with others, espe-
cially 91.7% of fooling rate on middle and high frequencies,
which is 7.5% higher but with a nearly imperceptible per-
turbation when compared to the perceivable UAP (spatial).
With a similar perceivability, FTUAP on full frequency in-
creases the fooling rate by about 10% as compared to UAP.
Generally, FTUAP gives higher fooling rates if trained on
more frequency bands and produces the highest fooling rate
after being trained on the full frequency bands.
4.2. Fooling Capability
To show the attacking ability of our FTUAP, we imple-
ment UAP and our FTUAP in middle frequency (FTUAP-
MF), middle&high frequency (FTUAP-MHF) and full fre-
quency (FTUAP-FF) separately, on several modern CNN
classifiers, including VGG [29], Inception2 [30, 31] and
ResNet [9] classifiers pretrained on the ImageNet in the
Pytorch library. Then we also compare our results with
the published results of some state-of-the-art universal ad-
versarial attack algorithms - GAP [24], NAG [25] and
iPGD [27], as listed in Tables 1 and 2.
In Table 1, our FTUAP-FF achieves the best performance
2To implement block-wise DCT transform, the image size must be an
integral multiple of 8, thus for Inception3 model, the 299 × 299 input
image is resized to 296× 296 for FTUAP.
6
Table 1: Comparison of fooling rates for different universal perturbations on pretrained CNN classifiers. Green indicates the
best performance and blue indicates the second best performance.
VGG16 VGG19 ResNet50 ResNet152 GoogLeNet Inception3
UAP [18] 84.8 86.6 84.2 77.0 69.4 55.1
GAP [24] 83.7 80.1 - - - 82.7
NAG [25] 77.6 83.8 86.6 87.2 90.4 -
FTUAP-MF 86.4 86.0 84.9 83.1 72.8 60.9
FTUAP-MHF 90.1 90.3 91.7 90.2 82.3 71.3
FTUAP-FF 93.5 94.5 93.6 92.7 85.8 82.7
Table 2: Comparison of top-1 accuracy between iPGD attack method [27] and our FTUAP-FF on 5000 training samples.
Bold values correspond to best performance.
VGG16 ResNet152 GoogLeNet Inceptionv3 mean
iPGD [27] 22.5 16.4 19.8 20.1 19.7
FTUAP-FF 9.3 12.0 20.9 23.8 16.5
in terms of fooling rate on most targeted models, and our
FTUAP-MHF provides significantly less-perceivable per-
turbations while also performing well, especially on VGG
and ResNet models. It is worth noting that by only attack-
ing the middle frequency bands, FFTUAP-MF is able to re-
sult in similar or higher fooling rates on all the listed mod-
els as compared to UAP. FFTUAP-FF, which produces the
best quantitative results among all the FFTUAP variants,
significantly upgrades the attack performance of UAP by
about 8% on VGG16, VGG19 and ResNet50 models, more
than 15% on ResNet152 and GoogLeNet models, and over
20% on the Inception3 model. From Table 2, it can be seen
that our FTUAP-FF exhibits a better overall attack power on
the four models, specifically with lower top-1 accuracies on
the VGG16 and ResNet152 networks and marginally higher
ones on the GoogLeNet and Inception3 architectures. One
can show that our frequency-tuned method would also en-
hance the iPGD algorithm by further reducing the top-1 ac-
curacies, given the promising improvement from UAP to
FTUAP.
On the other hand, we use perturbations which are com-
puted for the specific targeted model to attack other untar-
geted models, to test if transferability can also be improved
by our frequency-tuned algorithm, which serves as a very
useful property for black-box attacks. Table 3 shows that
our method can not only equip UAP with stronger white-
box attack ability, but also promote the cross-model gen-
eralization of the perturbation, i.e., stronger black-box at-
tacks. For the generalization for each perturbation, UAP
hardly produces a mean fooling rate of over 60%, while
all the perturbations by our FTUAP-MHF and FTUAP-
FF result approximately in an overall increase by 7%.
In particular, FTUAP-MHF and FTUAP-FF reach 75%
and 74%, respectively, in terms of mean fooling rate on
ResNet152, whereas the highest one for UAP is only 60.1%
on ResNet50. Interestingly, according to the mean fooling
rates, FTUAP-MHF generally shows better generalization
on various models than FTUAP-FF.
4.3. Attacks on Defended Models
Given that a number of advanced defense algorithms
have been published against adversarial attacks, we also
consider examining the potential of our FTUAP algorithm
against the defended models. We adopt the currently
strongest defense algorithm [4]. According to [4], the de-
fended model can outperform existing state-of-the art de-
fense strategies and even effectively withstand unseen at-
tacks via resilient feature regeneration. According to Ta-
ble 4, our FTUAP-FF outperforms UAP on all three tested
models. Altough UAP can only attack the defended mod-
els marginally with the top-1 accuracy decrease of less then
4%, FTUAP-FF undermines the defense by reducing the
accuracy with approximately 15% and 9% on VGG16 and
GoogLeNet, respectively, which indicates that our method
can also reinforce the attacking ability of UAP towards the
defended models.
4.4. Distributions of Perturbation Values
We visualize the distributions of different FTUAP per-
turbations in the spatial domain together with a UAP per-
turbation in Figure 5. For the histogram of UAP, we find
that the perturbation values are inclined to concentrate near
the perturbation boundary (‖δ‖∞ = 10, i.e., ‖δ‖∞ ≈ 0.04
in the normalized image scale [0, 1].) Since FTUAP is not
restricted directly in the spatial domain but rather in the fre-
quency domain, the shown distributions are not obviously
bounded. For the low frequency attack, its perturbation val-
ues cluster near zero with a narrow range, while the pertur-
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Table 3: Cross-model fooling rates. The first row displays the attacked models, and the first column indicates the targeted
models for which adversarial perturbations were computed.
VGG16 VGG19 ResNet50 ResNet152 GoogLeNet mean
VGG16
UAP 84.8 72.4 43.1 33.5 40.2 54.8
FTUAP-MF 86.4 76.4 50.4 39.5 47.4 60.0
FTUAP-MHF 90.1 79.9 54.0 40.5 46.3 62.2
FTUAP-FF 93.5 84.7 50.3 38.3 42.4 61.8
VGG19
UAP 76.8 86.6 41.7 32.9 39.7 55.5
FTUAP-MF 79.6 86.0 47.1 37.4 48.4 59.7
FTUAP-MHF 82.1 90.3 50.8 39.6 49.5 62.5
FTUAP-FF 87.0 94.5 47.7 36.8 42.3 61.7
ResNet50
UAP 64.9 61.0 84.2 45.3 45.0 60.1
FTUAP-MF 73.2 64.6 84.9 50.3 47.8 64.2
FTUAP-MHF 75.6 68.0 91.7 53.8 52.1 68.2
FTUAP-FF 74.9 70.0 93.6 57.8 52.0 69.7
ResNet152
UAP 58.9 55.8 55.1 77.0 39.4 57.2
FTUAP-MF 66.1 58.8 60.8 83.1 46.2 63.0
FTUAP-MHF 79.3 71.4 75.3 90.2 59.0 75.0
FTUAP-FF 74.5 69.7 77.1 92.7 56.0 74.0
GoogLeNet
UAP 57.9 56.8 43.7 35.0 69.4 52.6
FTUAP-MF 66.2 64.3 49.1 42.0 72.8 58.9
FTUAP-MHF 68.6 67.3 54.4 42.6 82.3 63.0
FTUAP-FF 64.0 63.7 52.9 42.7 85.8 61.8
UAP: 0.0325 FTUAP-LF: 0.0210 FTUAP-MF: 0.0410 FTUAP-HF: 0.0463
FTUAP-LMF: 0.0406 FTUAP-LHF: 0.0404 FTUAP-MHF: 0.0472 FTUAP-FF: 0.0437
Figure 5: Histograms of different perturbations in the spatial domain. From left to right: (top) results by UAP, FTUAP in
low, middle and high frequency (LF, MF, HF); (bottom) results by FTUAP in low&middle, low&high, mid&high and full
frequency (LMF, LHF, MHF, FF). Each histogram only describes one specific perturbation, under which the type of attack
and the standard deviation of perturbation values are given. The image scale is normalized and all the perturbations by
FTUAP have been transformed back to the spatial domain before visualization.
bation histogram of the middle frequency attack has a wider
shape, meaning that higher frequency components lead to
a wider dynamic range of perturbation values. When the
frequency goes high, the histogram shows a Laplacian-like
distribution with a sharp spike as well as longer tails. When
more frequency bands are included in generating a FTUAP
attack (bottom row of Figure 5), the distribution turns out
to be Gaussian-like, which is similar for the attack which
includes components in the middle frequency.
As our FTUAP computes the perturbations in the DCT
domain, we show some histograms by extracting single fre-
quency bands of perturbations trained by FTUAP-FF. Ac-
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Table 4: Comparison of top-1 accuracy between UAP and
FTUAP-FF by attacking the defended models in [4].
VGG16 ResNet152 GoogLeNet
No attack 66.3 79.0 67.8
UAP 62.5 76.7 65.5
FTUAP-FF 51.1 74.2 58.4
freq. (0, 0) freq. (0, 3) freq. (0, 7)
freq. (2, 7) freq. (4, 7) freq. (7, 7)
Figure 6: Histogram examples of perturbation distribution
in one DCT frequency band. Below each histogram is the
corresponding frequency band index as shown in Figure 3.
cording to Figure 6, many values are on the JND threshold
boundary (i.e., abrupt high values at the two ends of the his-
tograms for freq. (0, 0) and (0, 3)), which are very likely
to be clipped by thresholds during training. When the fre-
quency becomes higher, the values on the boundary starts
to decrease and shift to zero. Given this, we infer that with
the constraints of JND threshold, our FTUAP-FF can find
the local optimal values more likely in middle and high fre-
quency bands, while some low frequency components have
their optimal solutions beyond the JND thresholds and thus
suffer from truncation.
5. Conclusion
Motivated by the fact that the human contrast sensi-
tivity varies in functions of frequency, in our proposed
frequency-tuned attack method, we integrate contrast sen-
sitivity JND thresholds for generating frequency-domain
perturbations that are tuned to the two-dimensional DCT
frequency bands. In comparison with the baseline UAP,
our FTUAP is able to achieve much higher fooling rates
in a similar or even more imperceptible manner. Addition-
ally, according to the conducted experiments, the proposed
FTUAP significantly improves the universal attack perfor-
mance as compared to existing universal attacks on various
fronts including an increased fooling rates of white-box at-
tacks towards the targeted models, cross-model transferabil-
ity for black-box attacks and attack power against defended
models. The perturbation by our FTUAP method is adap-
tively bounded in the frequency domain as compared to ex-
isting method, and is more likely to reach the local optimum
for middle and high frequency components.
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